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We replicate Shaw (1996) who found that individual wage growth is higher for individuals with 
greater preference for risk taking. Expanding her dataset with more American observations 
and data for Germany, Spain and Italy, we find mixed support for the earlier results. We 
present and estimate a new model and find that in particular the wage level is sensitive to 
attitudes towards risk taking. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Investment in human capital is risky. Both the amount of human capital produced from 
given effort and resources and the returns to the human capital are uncertain at the time 
of investment. As individuals are known to differ in risk attitudes (Hartog, Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Jonker, 2002; Dohmen et al., 2005), one predicts, given everything else, a 
relationship between risk attitudes, investment and wages: less risk averse individuals 
will invest more and will experience higher wage growth (and presumably, more 
volatility). This indeed, is exactly what Shaw (1996) attempted to test. She reports clear 
support for the prediction that risk averse individuals shy away from investing in (risky) 
human capital and hence, experience less wage growth. Other empirical research on this 
relationship barely exists. Belzil and Leonardi (2007) studied the impact of risk attitudes 
on formal education; Dohmen et al (2007) report that individuals sort themselves into 
jobs according to wage risk and that this creates a link between wage levels and risk 
attitudes, although no link is made between risk attitudes, human capital investment, 
and wage changes. Brown and Taylor (2005) estimate a relationship between risk 
attitude and wage growth for the United Kingdom that is inspired by Shaw (1996); they 
extend the model and find support for this extension, but they have not attempted a strict 
replication.  
 
We replicate Shaw’s estimates on datasets for four countries: an extension of her 
original American data set and data for Spain, Germany and Italy. We decided to this 
replication because the topic is relevant, the intuition of the model is appealing and 
because Shaw’s original results were clearly in support of the key hypothesis
1. We find 
that risk attitude and wages are indeed connected, but not in the way that the Shaw 
model predicts. In the next section we present the model. In section 3 we introduce and 
discuss our data sets, in section 4 we present the replication results, in 5 we test the 
constraints imposed on the model. In Section 6 we present a new model, 7 gives the 
estimation results and 8 concludes. Detailed data descriptions are given in an appendix.  
 
 
2. The Shaw model 
                                                 
1 In line with the growing interest in the relevance of risk for education issues (see the 2007 Special Issue 
of Labour Economics), interest in Shaw’s paper is also growing.. In March 2009, the paper had 16 
citations at IDEAS, one before 2000, 10 in 2005 or later.  
   2 
 
For a given individual, suppressing possible subscripts for potential variation across 
individuals, Shaw starts from the standard human capital earnings function:  
 
  (1 ) tt t Ws k =−           ( 1 )  
 
The observed wage equals the value of the human capital stock, net of new investment 
cost, at human capital rental rate equal to unity.  
 
The capital stock grows from investment:  
 
  11 1 tt t t t kk s k γ −− − =+          ( 2 )  
 
where γt equals the productivity of the investment, i.e. the addition to the capital stock 
per unit of capital invested. Writing  
 
  11 1 (1 ) tt t Ws k −− − =−          ( 3 )  
 
and assuming the differences between st  and  st-1 are small enough to neglect, it is 
straightforward to derive the approximation  
 
  1 ln tt t Ws γ − Δ=          ( 4 )  
 
Using a model for optimal lifetime investment in human and financial capital, following 
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 is the Sharpe 
ratio for human capital: the expected net return to human capital investment relative to 
its variance (the return to risk). η is the marginal rate of substitution between financial 3 
wealth and human capital, assumed constant, μh is the expected rate of return on human 
capital . 
 
Shaw applies two alternative strategies to measure individual risk attitude R: either use 
direct survey measures of risk attitude or derive a substitute by assuming that the same 
risk attitude determines financial investment. The latter is based on a similar equation 











=           ( 6 )  
 
where μf is the expected return to risky financial assets, σ
2
f  its variance and r the return 
on safe assets. This financial Sharpe ratio is a constant determined in the capital market 
and can be written as b = σ
2
f /μf – r; (6) can be used to write risk attitude R as inversely 
proportional to observable risky financial investment share α. We can then substitute for 















        (7) 
 
Thus, an individual’s wage growth is determined as a function of the benefits from 
human capital investment (productivity of investment multiplied by expected net returns 
per unit of risk), the share of financial wealth in risky assets and a constant derived from 
the capital market. The benefits from human capital investment are specified as  
 
         ( ) ih i i i XA γ μη ξ −= +         (8)     
 
with ξi  i.i.d. measurement errors and X a matrix of individual characteristics. This 
implies that the wage growth equation equals  
 








Δ= +         (9) 
 4 
Thus, individual wage growth is related to the observable investment share of risky 
assets multiplied by the benefits from human capital investments. As Shaw notes, the 
error term is heteroscedastic, as it depends on the financial investment share αi : ei = bαi 
ξi / 
2
h σ : residual variance is increasing in risky wealth share.  
 
If we have direct observations on risk aversion R, we can use these as regressors, 
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Δ= +             ( 1 1 )  
 
with heteroscedastic errors as before as 
2 / ii h i eR ξσ =  depends on individual risk 
attitude R: residual variance is decreasing with increasing risk aversion. Now, wage 
growth is explained from productivity growth divided by risk aversion.  
 
In her empirical application, Shaw estimates, for individual i,  
 
'
0 ln (1 ) ii i i i W Riskattitude X A H e βγ Δ= + ++      ( 12) 
 
 where  i Δln W is hourly wage growth, Riskattitude measures the attitude of an individual 
toward risk, i X is the matrix for human capital variables and i H  includes additional 
controls. The essence of the model is a multiplicative specification of human capital 
stock and risk attitude.  
 
As noted, risk attitudes R are measured in two ways. The first measure is based on 
equation (6). As the capital market sets the Sharpe ratio identical for everyone, the 
proportion of wealth invested in risky assets is proportional to the inverse of risk 5 
aversion R. Thus, in equation (12) risk aversion is represented by the share of financial 
wealth placed in risky assets. The second measure is a set of dummies taken from 
survey questions in which individuals were asked about their attitudes towards taking 
financial risks. The responses were categorized into four groups: “take substantial 
risks”, “take above-average risks”, “take average risks”, and “take no risks”.  
 
The Shaw model formalizes the plausible argument that willingness to take risk may 
enhance careers. The details of the specification are open for discussion however and in 
fact, below (in section 6), we will propose a new model that is similar in spirit but 
remedies the weaknesses we identify. First, we will faithfully follow Shaw’s model and 






To test Shaw’s model, we use data from four different sources: an extension of Shaw’s 
original American data (the Survey of Consumer Finances, SCF), the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP), the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF) and the 
Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). These datasets are described 
in the Appendix. 
 
The Survey of Consumer Finances is the natural candidate to re-examine Shaw’s model, 
as it allows us to include the same controls and measures of risk as in her own paper. 
Using the SCF, and following Shaw, we present the results of two alternative measures 
of individual’s attitudes towards risk. One based on the financial assets owned by the 
household (ASSET) and one based on the self-reported attitude towards taking financial 
risks. In the empirical regression, risk attitude is introduced through two dummy 
variables, i.e. RISK3 (which equals 1 if individuals are willing to take average risks) 
and RISK4 (which equals 1 if individuals are not willing to take any risks). The 
reference group consists of people who reported to be willing to take “substantial” or 
“above-average” risks. So, RISK3 and RISK4 indicate increasing levels of risk 
aversion. In the two cases, the set of controls included in vector  i H  are, as in Shaw, 
three dummy variables indicating whether the individual is a male, black, or member of 6 
a worker union. However, the time interval of the sample is now 1983-1989; Shaw’s 
original dataset referring to 1983-1986 is no longer available.  
 
In the German SOEP data we do not have the necessary information on individual 
possession of financial assets. There is however information on self-reported risk 
attitudes. This information differs slightly from that in the SCF. In the SOEP, 
respondents are asked to report their willingness to take risks in a variety of areas, such 
as financial matters, health, occupation and leisure and sport. We base our results on the 
willingness to take risks in the occupation. The answer to the willingness to take risk is 
recorded on a 0-10 scale, where 0 stands for complete unwilling to take risks and 10 for 
completely willing (see Dohmen et al., 2005, for validity issues). The results presented 
in the paper make use of a transformation of this 11-point risk measure into a 
continuous variable, assuming normality and using the conditional mean (Terza, 1987). 
In the German case control variables consist of three dummy variables that take value 1 
if the respondent lives in East Germany, is of German origin, and is a male. The first 
two dummy variables are added to represent the ethnic component in the German 
sample. The gender variable included in the regression is defined as in the US case. 
 
The Spanish EFF contains the same information on risk as the SCF. Thus, we present 
the results of two specifications: one based on the ASSET variable and one based on the 
risk dummies RISK3 and RISK4. There are, however, two differences relative to the 
specifications used with the SCF data. First, the EFF is not a panel and, consequently, 
data on individual’s wages over time is missing. Still, we can compute wage growth 
within the firm, as the EFF includes a question in which individuals are asked their 
starting salary in the present company. Since there is information on tenure, we can 
compute the total wage growth of individuals since they entered the firm. This means 
that we are only looking at the subgroup of workers that Shaw calls ‘job stayers’ (see 
Table 3 of Shaw´s paper). A difference with Shaw’s sub-sample of stayers however is 
that while she focuses only on job stayers in a 3-year period, we consider all the 
surveyed workers and their corresponding tenure in the present firm
2. We divide 
reported wage growth by years of tenure. The second difference is that the EFF does not 
contain information on the number of hours worked in a normal week when the 
individual entered the firm This means that we can not compute the past hourly wage, 
                                                 
2 We considered restricting our sample to 3-year-stayers only, but that leaves us with only 202 
observations (down from 758). Non-linear regressions did not converge and almost all variables in Table 
2 had insignificant coefficients. 7 
although we know the yearly wage at that time. Therefore, the results from the EFF are 
based on yearly wages
3. Finally, the controls included in vector  i H  are four dummy 
variables indicating whether the individual works for a big firm (more than 500 
workers), is a male, has a non-permanent contract and is single. The dummy variable 
big firm, no permanent contract and single is included to represent insider-outsider 
effects in Spain (outsiders are young rather than old, have a temporary rather than a 
permanent contract and work in small firms rather than in big firms). 
 
Finally, the data for Italy comes from the Italian Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth (SHIW). It is a panel survey (annual from 1977 to 1987 and biannual from 1989 
to 2000) carried out by Banca d’Italia (Bank of Italy). The survey contains detailed 
information on household characteristics, employment, income, assets, financial habits, 
type of home tenure and several questions related to homeownership and borrowing 
conditions. Additionally, starting from 1995, the survey also includes rotating questions 
aimed at the analysis of specific issues. The 1995 wave contains questions addressed to 
the household heads that allow us to construct a measure of absolute risk aversion (see 
Appendix); although the theoretical prediction is formulated with relative risk aversion 
we use absolute risk aversion, as the risk dummies are not identified as relative 
measures either and as multiplying with wealth adds much measurement error
4. We use 
the waves corresponding to 1993 and 1995 to estimate real wage growth. We chose this 
particular three year interval since it provides an acceptable number of individuals with 
valid answers in the risk attitude question that are present in both waves (1,357 
household heads).
5 Alternatively, the survey also provides information on the amount of 
assets held by the households. This allows us to construct a measure of risk behaviour 
based on the percentage of risky assets (bonds, shares and mutual funds) over all the 
household’s assets, as with the SCF and the EFF data. The controls included in vector 
i H  are dummies for region (North, Centre and South), gender, marital status and part 
time work. 
                                                 
3 Hourly earnings is the common unit in analysis of wage differentials. Although this is less than 
satisfactory, as most labour markets do not operate on an hourly basis and many jobs have implicit 
contracts with undetermined hours and unspecified relationship between hours and pay. In our Italian 
dataset we get good results with annual earnings in all specifications; this is not the case with hourly 
earnings.  
4 The model predicts inverse proportionality between wage growth and risk attitude. We follow Shaw in 
estimating with direct proportionality. In the Italian dataset, using the inverse of risky asset share also 
gives significant results.  
5 If we also consider the missing values in the risk attitude question the total sample is of 1,654 household 
heads. Some of these missing responses have a number in the assets variable. 8 
 
 
4. Replicating Shaw’s results 
 
For our empirical analysis we will proceed as follows. We will first replicate Shaw as 
close as possible on new data; we will use, to the extent possible, exactly her 
specifications and her choice of variables, adjusted for data availability and country 
specific relevance. This means that for the US we use male, black and union as controls 
(H); for Germany instead we use male, living in East and German origin; for Spain, 
male, big firm, single and temporary, for Italy we use male, single, part-time work and 
three regions. Being member of a union is not a relevant distinction in Europe, neither is 
being black; in the Spanish labour market, flexible contracts are akin to a non-union 
(“unprotected”) position, in Italy single and part-time point to a weaker labour market 
position. Many other variables may be irrelevant, e.g. immigrant status, but for 
comparability we neglect these. We will start by strict and faithful replication, including 
some specification test and also add some new tests.  
 
 
4.1 Basic replication  
 
We start by replicating Shaw’s baseline results as reported in her Table 1. To be 
precise
6, we estimated (13A) with the asset share specification for risk and (13D) with 
the dummy specification for risk (ignoring the straightforward linear part for the control 
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6 We deduced the specification from Shaw’s equation (8), plus information in the text, the footnote to 
Table 1 and note 11.  9 
 
The variable Asset is the share of financial wealth invested in risky assets, Risk3 (“take 
average risk”) and Risk4 (“take no risk”) are the risk attitude dummies, with taking 
substantial and above-average risk as the omitted category. For ease of comparison, we 
copy Shaw’s Table 1, as our own Table 1.  
 
Shaw does not report the coefficients on the controls in H nor the intercept. The 
variables included in X are: changes in tenure, changes in tenure squared, changes in 
experience squared and level of education
7. The results Shaw reports are completely in 
line with her predictions: risk-taking individuals obtain, through tenure, experience, and 
education, higher increases on wages. These clear results provided a strong stimulus to 
the present replication study.  
 
 
Table 1. Shaw’s original results, SCF 83-86 ΔLn(hourly wage) 
  ASSET   Risk  dummies 
   Coef  t    Coef  t 
Asset                                                           β 1.04  2.39       
Risk aversion weak   (RISK3)                      β3      -0.4650  -4.37 
Risk aversion strong  (RISK4)                   β4       -0.5080  -4.54 
Change years tenure  (DTENURE)            ax1 0.0320 6.08    0.0450  5.08 
Change years tenure
2   (DTEN2)                ax2 -0.0006 -3.07    -0.0007  -2.23 
Change years experience^2   (DEXP2)     ax3 -0.0007  -3.49    -0.0007  -4.79 
Years of education  (EDUC)                       ax4 0.0071  2.42    0.0068  1.79 
          
R
2 0.0559      0.0586   
Sum squared error/sum weights  22.25      22.05   
Source: Shaw (1996), Table 1.  
 
We replicate Shaw’s estimations using an extension of her data set (1983 to 1989 
instead of 1983 to 1986) and the German, Spanish and Italian data set
8. Results are 
presented in Table 2. Following her specification, we use sampling weights to restore 
representativity in case of oversampling particular groups (which is not necessary for 
the Italian sample). Although Shaw only presents results for the main variables, we 
show the complete table. 
 
As mentioned above, a particularity of the Spanish sample is that we only have 
information on individual’s current wage and their starting wage with the present 
                                                 
7 See footnote 11 and the note to Table 1 in Shaw’s paper. The constant term is required to identify ß: 
without it the distinction between ß and A would be arbitrary. 
8 Following Shaw, we use the 20-64 age interval. For the SCF and the EFF, the results do not change 
significantly when this interval is changed (23-61 and 25-59 give similar coefficients). 
 10 
employer. This means that the Spanish data resemble Shaw’s sub-sample of job stayers. 
Empirically, this implies that the changes in tenure are equal to changes in experience 
and the (linear) effects of experience on wage growth cannot be disentangled from the 
(linear) effects of tenure. Thus we refer to the relevant variable as change in years of 















Table 2. Shaw’s results replicated, ΔLn(hourly wage)  
  Risk Dummies and Risk Attitude    ASS
  USA   Germany   Spain   Italy   USA   Spain  
 Coef  t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef 
Constant                           a0 0.450  2.75    0.219  7.26    -0.222  -1.46       0.166 2.12    0.646 5.86    -0.113 -1.50    -0.042 
Risk 3 (averse)                 β3  -0.460  -4.96          -0.067    -0.31                         
Risk 4 (more averse)       β4  0.118  0.94           -0.279    -1.71                         
Risk (0-10 transf.)           β        0.025  0.59                           
Asset                                β                      1.116  4.52   1.249  2.85   1.130 
Absolute Risk Aversion  β                 -0.593  -7.03              
    
Δ years tenure/exper.     aX1   0.067 3.22 0.042 4.23  
Δ years tenure                aX1 -0.007  -1.03 0.003 1.82 0.016 1.34 0  .009 2.47 0.002 
(Δ years tenure)^2          aX2 0.000  1.19 -1·10
-4 -0.39 -1·10




(Δ years experience)^2       -0.001  -5.99 -0.001 -12.44  -5·10
-4 -2.28 -1·10
-4 -0.61 -0.001 -7.64 -4·10
-5 -3.26 1·10
-5 
Years of education         aX4  -0.021 -2.31    -0.000 -0.04     0.023   2.25    -0.012 -1.88    -0.004 -0.76     0.010   1.81    -0.001 
Union                             aH1 -0.137  -3.38 -0.107 -2.57  
Black                              aH2 -0.295  -4.70 -0.219 -3.05  
Male                               aH3 0.047  1.01 0.001 0.07 0.108 2.24 0.007 0.15 -0.120 -2.54 0.154 3.50    0.009 
East                                aH1   -0.002 -0.22  
German                          aH2   -0.002 -0.13  
Big firm                         aH1   -0.014 -0.33 -0.027 -0.65  
Single                             aH2   0.065 1.37 -0.012 -0.26 0.111 2.47 -0.036 
No permanent                aH4   -0.122 -2.54 -0.111 -2.49  
Part time                        aH4     0.208 
Centre                            aH4   -0.066 -1.82 -0.060 
South                             aH4   -0.055 -1.84 -0.038 
Nbr. Observations  1746 7562 758 1,309 1688 751
χ












Table 2 shows that Shaw’s initial results cannot unequivocally be reproduced. Consider 
first the results on the core theme, the mediating effect of risk attitude on investment 
intensity. When we measure risk attitude through asset holdings, the theory is confirmed 
for the US and for Spain, but not for Italy. For the US, the magnitude of the effect is 
similar to the original estimate (1.11 against 1.04). With direct measures of risk attitude, 
the model is clearly rejected for Germany and support in Spain is weak. In the US, more 
risk averse workers still have lower wage growth, but the most risk averse (Risk4) have 
no longer a wage growth that differs from those who love to take risk. For Italy, with the 
measure of absolute risk aversion, the prediction is strongly supported. Thus, the 
replication results are mixed, even for the US. In the European countries, either the 
dummy measure has the predicted effects or the asset measure, but not both. In Germany 
we have only one measure and it does not have the predicted effect.  
 
The role of the human capital variables in explaining wage growth is also different from 
the initial results. In Table 1, the effect of changes in tenure is mostly positive and 
concave and presumably, the same holds for changes in experience (where only the 
quadratic effect can be estimated), a result that holds both in the risk dummy 
specification and in the asset share specification. These patterns are only weakly 
reproduced. The positive effect of change in tenure is found for Spain in both 
specifications, in the US for assets and in Germany at low level of significance (8%). The 
change in tenure squared is never significant except for Italy in the dummy specification. 
Only the change in experience squared is solidly negative except for Italy. The positive 
effect of years of education is only convincingly reproduced for Spain. Instead, in the US 
and Spain for risk dummy the effect of education is negative, which contradicts Shaw´s 
results.  
 
In her footnote 11, Shaw notes that gender and race are never significant, while union 
membership has a negative effect. We replicate, for the US, the negative effect of union 
membership. However, being black has a negative effect in the replication and male has a 13 
negative effect although only for the asset share specification. In Spain, men have faster 
wage growth, in Germany and Italy there are no differences by gender.   
 
We also find big differences in explained variance (R
2). It increases threefold in the US 
replication (from 0.06 in Shaw to about 0.2), it is remarkably low in Italy (0.01) and even 
more remarkably high in Spain (about 0.4) . To the latter outcome we will return later.  
 
   
4.2 Heteroscedasticity 
 
As Shaw notes, the model implies heteroscedasticity, as risk attitude is correlated with 
the error term (see equations (9) and (11)). There would be even more heteroscedasticity 
if we allow measurement errors in risk R or investment share α, as the error term would 
then also correlate with X. In her test, however, Shaw shows that heteroscedasticity is 
rejected (cf p. 639). She does not pay much attention to it, although in fact it strikes at the 
heart of the model: the very structure of the theory implies heteroscedasticity. We use the 
same test (White and Domowitz, 1984)
9 and present the results in the penultimate row 
(with the heading χ
2 statistic) of Table 2. We find significant levels of heterocedasticity in 




As heteroscedasticity is an important feature of the model, we regressed the squared 
residual from the regressions in Table 2 on risk attitude, schooling, experience and 
tenure. Results are reported in Table 3. Risk attitude is indeed related to the residual 
                                                 
9 Using White and Domowitz’s (1984) notation, our wage growth equation can be written 
as e   θ) f(M, Y + = , where M is a vector containing all explanatory variables (Risk, X, and H) and θ is the 
vector of coefficients (β, ax, ah). White and Domowitz’s test consist on regressing the residuals squared of 
the above equation on the gradient vector  θ ∂ θ ∂ ) ˆ , (M f  and all non-redundant products 
j i,   , ) ˆ , ( ) ˆ , ( ∀ θ ∂ θ ∂ ⋅ θ ∂ θ ∂ j j i i M f M f . The resulting N·R
2 follows a  2 χ distribution with K(K+1)/N degrees of 
freedom. 
10 In the results reported in Section 4 and 5, we do not correct for heteroscedasticity, to maintain 
comparability with Shaw’s results. In our own empirical exercise, reported in Section 6, we will estimate 
robust standard errors.  14 
variance, but only in three out of the seven specifications
11. In the Asset specification, 
there is never a significant effect, in the dummy specification we find higher residual 
variance for the less risk averse, except for Spain, where there is no significant 
relationship at all. Education increases residual variance in the US, but not in the other 
countries. Men, remarkably, have lower residual variance in the US and Germany but not 
elsewhere. Tenure has no effect in the US, positive effect in Spain but negative effect in 
Germany and a weakly significant non-linear effect in Italy. With the exception of 
Germany, experience barely affects residual variance.  
 
                                                 
11 Shaw does not run regressions but shows in a tabulation in footnote 22 that the variance of residual 
income growth and the variance of residual log income level are higher for individuals in classes with 
lower risk aversion.   15 
Table 3. The sources of heteroscedasticity (squared residuals from regressions in Table 2) 
  Risk Dummies and Risk Attitude   
 USA    Germany    Spain    Italy   USA   Spain  
 Coef  t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t   C
Constant                          a0       0.274 7.17   0.041  0.18    0.378 2.40         0.030    0.15    0.
Risk 3 (averse)                β3  -0.351 -2.56            -6·10
-5  -0.01                  
Risk 4 (more averse)        β4  -0.026 -0.15          0.049   0.81                  
Risk (0-10 transf.)           β       0.029 4.54                       
Asset                                β                      0.028 0.22        0.008 0.09    -0.
Absolute Risk Aversion  β                 -0.086 -2.67             
Δ years tenure/exper.     aX1         0.066 2.69        0.063 2.57   
Δ years tenure                aX1  0.0014     0.13  -0.008 -3.53    0.025 1.49   0.003   0.26       0.
(Δ years tenure)^2          aX2 -4·10
-5  -0.12  -1·10
-4 -0.67  3·10
-5   0.68  -0.001 -1.86  -2·10
-5  -0.75  1·10
-5   0.13    -0.
(Δ years experience)^2  aX3 -1·10
-4  -0.28  -1·10
-4 -4.82  -6·10
-5  -1.86  -1·10
-5  -0.51  -1·10
-5  -0.23  -5·10
-5  -1.64   1·
Years of education         aX4   0.047   2.84  0.001 0.25  -0.004 -0.25  0.006 0.71   0.051   2.46  -7·10
-5  -0.06    0.
Union                             aH1  -0.176 -1.67                    -0.162  -1.62        
Black                              aH2  -0.065 -0.66            -0.216  -3.10      
Male                               aH3   -0.609  -3.20  -0.044 -3.65  0.037 0.92      -0.088 -0.68   -0.607  -3.11  0.044 1.22    -0.
East                                aH1   -0.011 -0.75               
German                          aH2   -0.002 -0.08            
Big firm                         aH1   -0.148 -1..69      -0.145  -1.71   
Single                             aH2   -0.020 -0.41      -0.101 0.84  -0.033    -0.76    -0.
No permanent                aH4   -0.034 -1.11     -0.031 -0.87   
Part time                        aH4     0.513 1.89     0.
Centre                            aH4   -0.054 -0.59     -0.
South                             aH4   0.002 0.03     -0.
     
# Observations  1746   7562   758   1309  1746  751   
R




4.3 The effect of risk on wage growth is the same through all the human capital 
variables.  
Like Shaw, we consider the option that the effect of risk on wage growth is different for 
each of the four human capital variables used in the model. To do so, we expand the 
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Shaw concludes that the coefficients βj are not identical for all the xj in the risk attitude 
dummy specification and that therefore the constraint imposed in equation (13) is not 
acceptable (footnote 14). In the Asset specification, she reports “lower significance 
levels”, without giving details
12.   
 
The estimation results for equation (14) are given in Appendix Table B1. For Germany, 
we can confirm (as in Table 2) that risk does not play a role in determining wage growth. 
For the US we find that the specification still performs well, while for Spain, both 
specifications perform worse. For Italy, the absolute risk aversion specification performs 
very strongly, the asset share specification has mostly insignificant coefficients.  
 
Let us now focus on whether or not the constraint of single risk interaction imposed in 
equation 13 (Table 2) is justifiable. We do this by testing for each interaction term 
whether the product of aj and β (Table 2) is identical to the product of aj and βj  (Table 
                                                 
12 In footnote 14 Shaw also notes that she dropped interaction of the intercept with the risk attitude 
dummies. We decided not to follow her and stick to the full model.  17 
B1), using a t-test for statistical difference
13. The test results (t-values on significant 
differences are given in Table 4, column I; full details are in Appendix Table B2. For the 
case of Germany, we only show the t-tests for the interaction between risk attitude and 
changes in years of experience squared since this is the only coefficient in Tables 2 and 3 
that shows a level of significance approaching acceptable levels. Equality of the risk 
aversion interactions is strongly rejected for the US, Germany and Spain, and less 




                                                 
13 Since comparing estimates involves combined coefficients (e.g. β·aXi), we need to take into account the 
standard deviation of such combination. This is done by using the “nonlinear combinations of estimators” 
option in STATA.  
14 For Italy the null hypothesis is not rejected for the interaction between ARA and years of schooling  18 
Table 4: Testing model constraints  
     t-values on the test 
   I II  III
   Variable βaj= βjaj θj=βaj  θj=βjaj
Constant 58.61 -76.98 89.03
Δ years tenure -115.42 -109.04  35.74
(Δ years tenure)^2 129.59 -26.38  -35.11
(Δ years experience)^2 -23.40 118.53  114.92
ASSET 
Years of education -48.33 3.43  -2.45
    
Constant 167.66 -191.23 261.17
Δ years tenure -181.16 -132.58  0.90
(Δ years tenure)^2 113.19 156.55  -37.10
(Δ years experience)^2 -152.80 -121.10  -10.90
Years of education -104.53 -90.43  0.62
  
Constant 167.36 -166.03 238.04
Δ years tenure -157.42 -101.07  0.70
(Δ years tenure)^2 76.08 82.33  -19.94
(Δ years experience)^2 -150.65 -100.79  -6.26
US 
RISK 
Years of education -153.90 -120.83  1.07
      
RISK (Δ years experience)^2  -102.40  -138.01 -49.17  Germany 
    
Constant -18.64 19.12 15.01
Δ years tenure/exp. -83.47 -49.01  0.01
(Δ years tenure)^2 4.92 3.78  -0.04
(Δ years experience)^2 87.61 49.43  0.13
ASSET 
Years of education 22.12 28.84  0.02
    
Constant 22.83 -0.26 18.86
Δ years tenure/exp. 28.44 -18.43  31.49
(Δ years tenure)^2 -41.51 6.99  -30.75
(Δ years experience)^2 -9.60 9.64  -13.17
Years of education -23.92 0.81  -14.64
  
Constant 17.88 0.23 14.24
Δ years tenure/exp. 39.40 -13.81  34.17
(Δ years tenure)^2 -41.29 -5.17  -20.79
(Δ years experience)^2 -24.84 8.56 -19.97
Spain 
RISK 
Years of education -15.50 10.01  -17.48
      
Constant 1.76 66.08 66.01
Δ years tenure -2.96 2.10  -0.83
(Δ years tenure)^2 4.50 3.07  7.59
(Δ years experience)^2 -2.83 3.40  0.56
RISK 
Years of education -1.55 4.16  2.58
  
Constant -77.25 -0.61 -80.28
Δ years tenure 279,11 -280.42  -0.97
(Δ years tenure)^2 -116,77 117.99  1.81
(Δ years experience)^2 -5,84 278.44  197.06
Italy 
ASSET 
Years of education 863,52 -870.11  -4.38
Column I: Table B2; column II: Table B5a; column III: Table B5b 19 
 
4.4 Sensitivity to outliers and other misreporting 
In the replication for the US we have tested the sensitivity of the results for outliers. If we 
exclude the top and bottom 1%, 2% or 5%, respectively, of wage growth, many 
coefficients are stable but the coefficients on some risk interaction terms change 
drastically, in magnitude, from significant to insignificant, from positive to negative. 
Shaw is silent on treatment of outliers, presumably because she does not apply any 
adjustment. 
 
Another important issue is the treatment of inconsistencies, for example measured 
experience increasing more than the time elapsed between two moments of observation. 
Our results for Germany appeared quite sensitive to corrections of such inconsistencies 
(like restricting the change in experience to time elapsed between observations). 
However, since Shaw is also silent on these issues, we did not attempt a systematic 
correction and choose to accept inconsistencies as measurement errors. 
 
As noted in the Appendix, the variable Asset has a very high proportion of zero’s. This 
would imply that the individual’s relative risk aversion is infinite, a rather extreme 
assumption. We tested the sensitivity to this extreme value by distinguishing zero and 
positive values: we added a dummy to the regression, thus including a dummy for having 
any risky financial assets at all and the share of risky financial assets. In the SHIW data 
for Italy, with the highest proportion of zero’s, including the dummy has no effect on the 
results for the other variables; the significance level for the share of risky assets does not 







                                                 
15 Brown and Taylor (2003), discussed below, also finds significant results if the sample is restricted to 
households with positive risky asset shares. 20 
5. Testing constraints in Shaw’s model  
5.1 Introduction 
Shaw derives her specification from a theoretical model and thereby imposes a number of 
a priori restrictions. In this section we will test whether the restrictions are accepted by 
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We call this model the unconstrained model, as it does not constrain the parameters to 
reflect a strict multiplicative effect of risk or assignment of explanatory variables to risk 
sensitive human capital variables X and other variables H. Starting from this most general 
specification (15), we consider three questions.  
 
The first question is whether risk is a relevant variable at all in the countries we study. 
This is a simple test of significance on coefficients relating to risk, θ. The second 
question is whether the assignment of variables to X (interaction) and to H (no 
interaction) is accepted by the data. The null hypothesis here is that θj = 0 for some j so 
that the interaction with risk is not relevant, for variables such as male, union and black. 
The third question is whether the parameter constraints on the interaction terms are 
acceptable. Equations (13) and (14) follow from restrictions on (15). Hence, we test 
whether  jj a θ β =  (equation (13)) and whether  jj j a θ β =  (equation (14)). Estimation 
results for equation (15) are given in Appendix Tables B3a-B3d. We will now seek an 
answer to our three questions. 
 21 
5.2 Is risk statistically relevant at all? 
 
As is clear from Table 5, the answer is yes. In each specification, in each country, there is 
some evidence that less risk averse individuals can have different wage growth either 
through a direct effect or by risk attitude affecting the impact of other relevant variables. 
Nevertheless, support for the underlying theory is sometimes quite weak. In Germany, 
the entire risk effect comes from one significant interaction term.  
 
 
Table 5. Is risk attitude relevant at all? 
  USA    Germany   Spain   Italy 
 Dummy  Assets    Dummy    Dummy  Assets    ARA  Assets 
Risk attitude R  x  x    -    -  -    -  -z 
R x Human  Capital  x  x    x    -z      x  x 
R x controls  x  x    -    x  -    x  x 
x: t≥ 1.96 for at least one variable in the group, equation (15); source: Appendix Tables B3a-B3d 
 z: t≥ 1.64 for at least one variable in the group, equation (15); source: Appendix Tables B3a-B3d 
ARA: Absolute risk aversion. 
 
 
5.3 Is the assignment of variables between H and X statistically acceptable?  
Shaw’s distinction is an a priori distinction between variables that are postulated to affect 
investment and variables that do not. Education, tenure and experience are selected to 
affect post-school investment, union membership, race and gender are supposed not to 
affect investment intensity or pay-off. The investment variables interact with risk 
attitudes as the share of wealth invested in risky human capital depends on risk attitude. If 
this model structure is correct, Union, Black and Male should have no wage effects 
through the investment process: interaction with risk attitude should be rejected by the 
data.  
 
As is clear from Table 5, this prediction of no interaction effects is not supported. Except 
for Germany and Spain (for Assets), interaction terms are significant for each country 
(see Appendix Tables B3a-B3d for details). Shaw’s a priori choices are not even 
supported in the replication for the US. In the attitude dummy specification, Black 
interacts significantly with risk attitude, while in the asset specification interaction with 22 
male is significant. In Spain, single and male has significant interaction in the dummy 
specification, while indeed in the asset specification no control variable has significant 
interaction. In Italy, part-time has significant interaction in the absolute risk aversion 
specification, while male and single significantly interact in the asset specification.  
 
Conversely, we find no significant interaction
16 with many human capital variables: not 
with education in Spain and Germany and not with education in the asset specification for 
the US, not for tenure in all specifications except the US with risk dummy and Spain 
(with assets and Italy with the self-assessed risk attitude, not for experience in Spain and 
Italy).  
 
We must conclude that in the US, in Spain and in Italy but not in Germany some 
variables not directly connected to the investment process but reflecting demographic 
differences also interact with risk attitude. Conversely, for all specifications except the 
dummy specification in the US, there are human capital variables that should have an 
effect through interaction with risk attitude but that do not.  
 
5.4 Are the parameter constraints on interaction terms acceptable? 
Shaw’s model constrains the interaction terms to a multiplicative specification with a risk 
attitude term and human capital terms. We could test these restrictions by comparing the 
coefficients on interaction terms in specification (15) with the constrained versions of 
(13) (identical risk attitude terms, Table 2) and of (14) (risk attitude terms vary by 
investment term, Table 3).  However, as we are still in the replication and testing stage, 
we decided to stay closer to Shaw’s specification and test the restriction on the model 
including Shaw’s a priori distinction between human capital variables X and control 
variables H. The estimation results of (15) including this distinction (but without the 
restriction that the interaction term is the product of a and β) are given in Appendix Table 
B4a-B4d; we call this the unconstrained a priori model.  
 
                                                 
16 At 5%; at 10% level results are slightly stronger.  23 
In Appendix Tables B5a-b we test the constraints, by testing whether the difference 
between the constrained and unconstrained estimates is significant
17. For Germany, this 
implies to focus exclusively on the coefficients of changes in years of experience squared 
and its interaction with risk, as this is the only statistically significant coefficient. In 
Table 4, we have collected the test results (t-values on the differences).  
 
In column II of Table 4, where we test against Table 2 (single risk effect), the result is 
clear: equality of coefficients is rejected for the US, Spain, Germany and Italy. In column 
III, we test against Table 3, where the risk attitude term is allowed to vary with the 
variables in X. Now, the model is rejected outright for the USA and Germany, for Spain 
with the risk attitude dummies but not for the asset specification and it is weakly rejected 
for Italy in both specifications.  
 
                                                 
17 As before, to test the equality of the estimates, we use a t-test statistic. Since comparing estimates 
involves combined coefficients (e.g. β·aXj), we need to take into account the standard deviation of such 
combination. This is done by using the “nonlinear combinations of estimators” option in STATA.  24 
 5.5 Conclusion on the replications 
We draw the general conclusion that Shaw’s results are not very robust. Replicating the 
model as faithful as possible, we find many deviations from her original estimates. The 
unequivocal support that she reports in her Table 1 does not generally hold. In our view, 
the strongest blow to the model specification is the rejection of coefficients on interaction 
being equal to the product of coefficients on the separate terms, with only support in the 
asset specification for Spain. Yet, in all countries we find that risk attitude is relevant for 
wage growth: in the general specification, risk attitude has always some significant 
impact, one way or another. We also found support where Shaw did not: 
heteroscedasticity, solidly predicted by the model, was rejected in the original estimates, 
but we could not reject it in any of the four countries. 
 
The outcomes of the replication studies differ between countries. Judging from the basic 
replications in Table 2 and the relevance of risk attitude assessed in Table 5, we conclude 
that there is a fair amount of support for the approach for the US and much less support 
for the other three countries. The strong result in Italy when risk attitude is measured with 
absolute risk aversion and the results in Table 5 suggest that support is stronger in Italy 
than in Spain and Germany, although the differences among the three European countries 
are quite weak. Before claiming any systematic effects here, we should reiterate 
differences in the data that may also leave their traces. There are differences in sample 
sizes (1746 for the US, 7562 for Germany, 758 for Spain and 1357 for Italy; the original 
US sample covered 2199 individuals), in the measurement of risk attitudes (ordinal 
intervals in US, Spain and Germany, reservation price for a lottery ticket in Italy) and in 
the length of the observation interval of wages (6 years in the US, 4 years in Germany, 3 
years in Italy and a variable length -tenure- in Spain; the original interval was 3 years). 
We know that the length of the observation interval has an impact: results improve for 
longer intervals (Brown and Taylor, 2003; our own exercises for Germany). The data for 
Spain are most removed from the original dataset. They refer to job stayers only, we do 
not know working hours and the sample size is smallest. Shaw also estimates separately 
for job stayers, but this does not affect her results in a relevant way (R
2 increases from 25 
0.06 to 0.08). These features may explain the very high share of explained variance in the 
Spanish data (see Table 2): smaller sample, longer observation period
18, stayers only. 
 
It is tempting to relate the different outcomes to different features of the labour markets. 
Institutional rigidities and more formalised wage setting may preclude exploitation of 
differences in risk attitudes. Table 6 presents indicators of the scope for rewards to risk 
taking, by looking at wage dispersions. The dispersion of log wage is highest in the US 
and substantially lower in Europe. Within Europe, wage dispersion is indeed highest in 
Italy but not much higher than in Germany, while in Spain it is substantially lower, 
suggesting (somewhat) more opportunity for gainful risk taking in Italy than in Spain 
(and Germany). In the change in log wages, we find that Spain and Germany are close 
together, with smaller dispersion than in the US. The remarkable finding is the very high 
dispersion in Italy. We should note here that we measure the standard deviation of the 
average annual wage change i.e the wage change observed over the interval length as 
dictated by the sample. By averaging change over the length of the interval, transitional 
shocks are averaged out, presumably converging to their mean zero. Thus, it is not 
surprising that Spain has the lowest dispersion, as it has the longest interval (interval 
lengths are equal to tenure and on average these are much larger than 2 or 3 years). In 
Italy the interval is only two years long, and this would push towards high measured 
dispersion. Other data sources do not support the notion that Italy has relatively high 
inequality. In fact, in the European Community Household Panel, Italy comes out with 
the lowest earnings inequality of the four countries
19. 
 
We can also look at institutional features of the labour market. Labour market regulation 
is much stronger in the US than in Europe. Within Europe there are also market 
differences but Italy is not known as markedly less regulated than the other two European 
countries. From the tables in Nickell (1997) we can see that in Italy union density and 
bargaining coordination, both on the employer side and on the union side, are at rather 
                                                 
18 Brown and Taylor (2003), discussed below, report a strong increase in R
2 if the wage growth interval is 
increased from 2 to 3 to 5 years: 0.021, 0.087, 0.168.  
19 Inequality is measured in decile ratio’s; data from Wiemer Salverda, private communication. Budría and 
Díaz-Giménez (2007) report the same result in their Table 16: Italy has the lowest inequality of our three 
European countries in terms of Gini coefficient and coefficient of variation. 26 
intermediate levels, union coverage (through collective bargaining) is high and the level 
of employment protection is very high. Support in case of unemployment, however, is at 
the low extreme among 20 OECD countries, with a replacement ratio of 20% and a 
benefit duration of 6 months.  
 
Table 6. Standard deviations log-wages, changes in log-wages and residuals of Table 2 
(dummies) 
 US  Germany  Spain  Italy 
Log wages  0.607  0.499  0.342  0.547 
Change Log wages (annual averages)  0.138  0.103  0.087  0.257 
Residuals (not squared)  0.873  0.408  0.485  0.492 
 
With institutions endogenous, it is also interesting to look at measures of cultural 
differences between populations (although the relationship can easily go both ways, with 
institutions also shaping “tastes”). Hofstede (2008), in his project on measuring cultural 
differences between societies, measured risk attitudes by the Index of Uncertainty 
Avoidance. To cite its definition: “It indicates to what extent a culture programs its 
members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. 
Unstructured situations are novel, unknown, surprising, different from usual. Uncertainty 
avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and 
rules, safety and security measures, and on the philosophical and religious level by a 
belief in absolute Truth; 'there can only be one Truth and we have it”. The score on the 
index is 46 for the US, 65 for Germany, 75 for Italy and 86 for Spain. The differences 
underline the commonly assumed gap in risk attitudes between the US and Europe, and in 
this sense match our results. But the ranking of the three European countries does not 
match our ranking of the replication results: relative to Spain and Germany, Italy does not 
stand out as a risk seeking society.  
 
We conclude that our replication results appear to be in conformity with indicators of 
labour market differences between the US and Europe. The less regulated American 
labour market is more conducive to risk taking and in this environment Shaw’s model 
performs better. But we are unable to link the differences in model performance within 
Europe to differences in labour market settings.  27 
 
We should note that conceivably, an effect of risk attitude on wage growth may not be 
causal but reflect the impact of other variables that correlate with risk attitude. For 
example, ability as measured by IQ is known to have such correlation. Controlling for 
schooling, also known to correlate strongly with ability should at least partly remedy this 
defect. But in fact, we cannot rule out that the correlation between ability and risk attitude 
originates in the fact that both correlate with education.  
 
 
6 A perspective on further research  
 
The replications have taught us that risk attitude does have some relationship with wage 
growth. However, the restrictions implied by Shaw’s model are not supported by the data. 
Moreover, we indicated in section 2 that we are critical about some features of the model. 
Here, we will comment on Shaw’s model, specify a new model and present some final 
estimation results based on the new model. 
 
6.1 Reflections on the Shaw model  
. 
The Shaw model is interesting as it formalises an attractive intuitive notion on risk, 
individual risk attitudes and wages within the human capital framework. But as always, 
one can take issue with the details of the specification. We identify five issues where we 
do not fully agree with the specification. First, the share of investment in new human 
capital s is approximated as a constant, on the argument that differences between two 
periods will be small. But a constant investment rate is at variance with the key prediction 
from human capital theory that it declines with experience, because of declining marginal 
benefits (as remaining working life shortens) and increasing marginal cost (as 
opportunity cost goes up from increasing pay-off from accumulated earlier investments). 
In practice, the change in the investment share has a non-negligible effect on wage 
growth. A one percentage point drop per year does not appear unrealistic, but neglecting 
this would neglect one percent point wage growth per year, which may be a substantial 28 
share of annual wage growth. In the empirical specification, concavity of the earnings 
profile is restored by relating the productivity of investment in producing new human 
capital to the variables that in the conventional Mincer equation generate concavity 
(experience and tenure). While empirically it is immaterial whether concavity is due to 
declining investment volume or to declining investment productivity, the former 
interpretation is both more appealing and in line with standard human capital theory.  
 
Second, equation (8) specifies an empirical relationship for the value of human capital 
itself, not for the value per unit of risk. This implies that the value of human capital 
investments depends on individual characteristics but that returns do not depend on risk. 
One would be inclined to predict that the labour market compensates for human capital 
risk as markets commonly do (see the evidence summarized in Hartog (2007), the 
example for the US in Hartog and Vijverberg (2007) and for Denmark in Diaz-Serrano et 
al. (2008)). If so, human capital risk would appear on the left hand side of (8). 
Remarkably, this would explain why Shaw does not find heteroscedasticity 
 
Third, equation (8) relates the value of human capital investment to the level of schooling 
and to changes in tenure and experience. This is an unmotivated ad hoc specification. 
Why would the value of investment depend on the change in tenure, rather than on tenure 
itself?  
 
Fourth, risk is not visible in the pay off to investment. The risky investment share 
responds to human capital risk (see equation (5)), but wages, ie the return to human 
capital, shows no sign of risk: according to equation (8) the value of human capital 
investments is subject to measurement errors but not to any volatility.  
 
Fifth, it is not clear what the return to human capital is. If μ-η in equation (5) refers to the 
rental rate of human capital, one would expect it to appear in the wage equation. If it is 
the discounted return per unit of investment, one would expect it to decline with age 
because of the shrinking horizon, unless infinite working life is assumed.  
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6.2 A new model 
 
In reaction to the shortcomings we identified above, we have constructed a new model to 
deal with risky human capital investment. We are rather pragmatic about this attempt. We 
do not intend our model to serve purely analytical purposes, with all the required 
precision and detail, we just want it as a framework for guidance and interpretation of 
empirical work.  
 
Suppose, individuals at age t invest a share st of their stock of human capital in the 
production of new capital. From standard human capital theory we know that this share 
will be declining in t, as marginal benefits fall from an approaching finite horizon and 
marginal costs increase with the returns to earlier investment. The result is a capital stock 
net of new investment, Kt, that is increasing in t at a decreasing rate and possibly 
declining after some point if depreciation starts to bite.  
 
Suppose, after deciding on their total investment, individuals decide on the degree of risk 
of their human capital portfolio (this means we neglect possible effects of risk attitude on 
total investment). There are two types of human capital, safe and risky. The safe human 
capital has return r, the risky has return μ + εt, where E(εt)  = 0, E()
22
t ε σ =  and 











=           ( 1 6 )  
 
where R is half the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion. This is just like Shaw’s 
model (see also Hartog and Vijverberg, 2007, which spells out the derivation).  
 
We can now write the wage at age t, Wt , as the return on human capital:  
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The first part is the return on risky human capital, the second on safe human capital, both 
weighted by their share in total net wealth K. We can rewrite this to 
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Pt is the average return on the individual’s human wealth. Note that we made the 
assumption that the individual always invests in the same proportion in safe and risky 
human capital, whether in school or in the post-school environment. In school, this 
involves selecting the proper mix of courses (Hartog and Vijverberg, 2007), when in the 
labour market this involves selecting the relevant career profile in terms of on-the-job 
training, formal courses, type of firm and industry, type of employment contract (.e.g 
length of probation periods), etc. Note that Shaw explicitly models growth of the human 
capital stock but does so at a constant investment rate. We just assume the standard 
human capital stock profile and model the share of risky investments in total human 
capital investment; this share will be constant unless some parameter would change with 
age.  
 
Equation (18) provides a good framework for estimation and interpretation. The wage is 
multiplicative in net human wealth and its rental price P. The price P is a weighted 
average of returns on the safe investment, of the risk premium and of the stochastic 
shock. We will derive key predictions, both for wage levels and for wage changes. Wage 
changes are defined as  
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Expected wage growth follows the net capital profile, actual wage growth dances around 
this profile according to the difference in shocks, weighted by a term in R: both wage and 
wage growth have heteroscedastic errors, in risk aversion R and in capital stock K, i.e. in 
the dimensions of time (age, experience, tenure).  
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which has a negative expectation, as E(εt) = 0. (remember that we have assumed a two-
step decision process, where individuals first decide on total investment and then on the 
degree of risk in their portfolio; total investment is then not affected by risk attitude).  
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, this implies a negative expected derivative if K is increasing and a 
positive derive if K is decreasing: higher risk aversion gives smaller absolute values of 
expected wage growth.  
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The variance of the wage level increases or decreases with the change in the capital stock 
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This is simply twice the variance of the wage level and thus, the derivatives of wage level 
and wage growth variance have the same sign.  
 
Thus, our model has the same key predictions as Shaw’s: wage level, wage change, wage 
variance and variance of wage change are all declining in risk aversion. Empirical work 
can focus on these key predictions.  
 
6.2 Implications for estimation. 
The structure of the wage equation leads to suggestions for estimation. The wage function 
is built up as a multiplication of size of the net capital stock and its rental price. The 
capital stock develops in function of age, experience and tenure. The (initial) level of the 
capital stock will also vary with education. The pricing equation depends on what we 
assume about the market for human capital. If human capital is homogeneous and 
divisible, like financial capital, rental rates r and μ are identical across the market and the 
variance of the return for the risky asset may also be the same throughout. The individual 
rental rate then only varies with R. If the market has subsets (i.e. capital heterogeneity 33 
across types, e.g. industries, or education) the price will vary across subsets with these 
characteristics.  
 
The wage equation we derived is highly similar to that developed by Shaw. But our clear 
separation in a human capital component and a pricing component can provide good 
guidance to specifications for estimation, as just suggested. We will not pursue this in the 
present paper. We will simply conclude by estimating a wage level equation and a wage 
change equation derived from the same specification, thus avoiding the curious ad hoc 
mixture of level and change variables that Shaw applied. If we estimate a wage level 
equation, we should have variables to reflect the capital stock: education, experience, 
experience squared, tenure, tenure squared. The pricing component should be represented 
by risk attitude, multiplicatively and the error term should also enter multiplicatively. We 
can use a multiplicative specification for the wage level, or estimate a log specification.  
 
If we estimate in wage changes, we can still use education, experience, experience 
squared and tenure, tenure squared, to reflect the changes in the capital stock, and there 
should be a multiplicative component in capital stock, risk attitude and error.  
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=−  i.e. heteroscedastic in K and R.  
 
The difference with the Shaw model is that we systematically distinguish between the 
capital stock and its price, and between a level specification and a change specification 
derived from the same basic model; we do not allow education to affect the change in 
wages. . As in Shaw, we do not invert the risk attitude measures but just enter them as 
they are, multiplicatively. To link up with the earlier results and common practice, we 
estimate earnings in logs. Table 7 presents the results.  
 
As Table 7a shows, the relevance of risk attitudes for wage levels is almost uniformly 
supported. Only in the ARA specification for Italy is risk attitude not significant. When 
we estimate in changes (of log earnings), in Table 7b, results are somewhat weaker: 
standard errors increase, and for the US, the most risk averse have no longer the largest 
wage growth, the coefficient for Germany is no longer significant. For Italy there is a 
reversal: risk attitude measured through asset holdings is no longer significant, but when 
measured directly in attitude it is
20. Note that we also find remarkably similar rates of 
return to education in the European countries: 7%, as compared to 9% in the US. Thus, 
we find remarkably strong support for our specifications. In wage levels, risk attiudes is 
only insignificant in the dummy specification for Italy; in all other cases, we find the 
predicted signs at conventional significance levels. In wage changes, our results are 
closer to the replication results: no significance in Germany, no significance in Italy for 
assets, a non-monotonic result for the USA in dummies.  
 
Brown and Taylor (2003) use data from the British Household Panel Surveys and also 
estimate the relationship of wage growth to risk attitude. The panel has no direct evidence 
on risk attitudes but it does have evidence on the risky asset share. They estimate Shaw’s 
                                                 
20 We have also estimated the models for wages rather than log wages. In levels the result are qualitatively 
quite similar to those in log levels (only the asset coefficient for Italy is no longer significant). In changes, 
estimation results are markedly weaker: a perverse result for the US in dummies, the Spanish dummy 
coefficients are no longer significant and the ARA specification for Italy does not converge. The risk 
coefficient for Germany is significant though. Thus we now find for Germany that risk attitude is 
significant in all specifications except in changes of log wages. 35 
model, with an a priori distinction between human capital variables X and controls H. 
However they deviate from Shaw by measuring experience in levels, allowing experience 
squared to be included, by omitting tenure and by measuring education in degrees rather 
than years. Asset share has a significant effect on wage growth; magnitude and t-value 
increase if they extend the interval of observed wage growth from 1995-1996 to 1995-
1998 and further to 1995-2000. Coefficient and significance level also increase if they 
instrument asset share. Thus their results also indicate that there is some sort of a 
relationship, but they relate wage growth to levels of experience, which does not seem 
proper to us.  
 
Finally, we tested the prediction that residual wage variance (risk) is higher for those who 
are less afraid to take risk. As Table 8 shows, the results are mixed. There is clear support 
for the prediction in Germany, a fair amount of support in Spain, weak support in the US, 
support in Italy for the absolute risk aversion specification but not for the asset 
specification. Significance levels do not change when we add the other variables to the 
regression equation, and magnitudes of coefficients are only marginally affected. Again 
we find better performance for the level specification than for wage changes. In levels, 
only the coefficient for Risk 4in the US and the coefficient for assets in Italy violates the 
prediction of wage variance increasing in willingness to take risk.  36 
Table 7a. Estimating the new model, in levels 
  Risk dummies and Risk Attitude    Assets 
  USA    Germany    Spain    Italy    USA    Spain    Italy 
  Coef  t  Coef  t   Coef  t   Coef  t   Coef  t   Coef  t   Coef  t 
Constant  0.933 9.12   0.738 24.48     6.12 79.48   0.803 0.10   1.031 10.62   5.844 100.51    0.809 8.14 
Risk 3 (averse)   0.002  0.17     -0.033 -4.40        
Risk 4 (more adverse)  -0.078 -6.34       -0.042 -5.88        
Risk (0-10 transf)    0.008 3.52         
Absolute Risk Aversion        -0.001 -0.23       
Asset         0.134 9.27   0.026 6.03   0.008 2.21 
Years of tenure/exp.     0.008 1.20     0.011 1.69    












 -0.86  -1·10
-5
-0.22  -1·10
-4  -1.93 








0.42   -0.000 -2.34  -2·10
-4
 -1.88  -1·10
-5
-0.30   -0.000 -2.37 
Years of education   0.090  19.54   0.071 43.20   0.074 18.69   0.069 18.14    0.075  15.69   0.071 19.03   0.067 17.29 
Union   0.119  4.82          0.130  5.08     
Black  -0.300 -8.64        -0.192 -4.70     
Male   0.243  9.06   0.241 26.40   0.285 10.46    0.123 2.52    0.207  7.55   0.289 10.60   0.119 2.45 
East   -0.324 -30.33           
German       -0.022 -1.20           
Big firm              0.186   8.03    0.175   7.55        
Single             0.014   0.55    0.034   1.30        
No permanent            -0.135  -4.87    -0.126  -4.53        
Part-time                            
Centre                 -0.003 -0.10            0.004 0.14 
South                 -0.090 -3.06            -0.081 2.74 
Married                 0.017 0.37             0.018 0.39 
N    2028    10402   1364     1309     1949     1353     1309 
R
2   0.965    0.960   0.998     0.94     0.966    0.998    0.940 37 
 
 
Table 7b. Estimating the new model, in changes 
  Risk dummies and Risk Attitude    Assets 
  USA    Germany    Spain    Italy    USA    Spain    Italy 
  coef  t   coef  t   coef  t    coef  t   coef  t   coef  t   coef  t 
Constant  0.855 9.70   0.216 19.40   0.094 2.14    0.030 1.13   0.396 7.58    0.068 2.54   -0.023 -1.38 
Risk 3 (averse)   -0.546 -7.13    -0.083 -0.48                 
Risk 4 (more adverse)   -0.045 -0.41    -0.298 -2.30               
Risk (0-10 transf)    0.026 0.62                  
Absolute Risk Aversion          -0.621 -5.26          
Asset             1.878 4.33   0.815 3.66   0.044 0.11 
Δ years of tenure/exp.     0.089 4.23         0.057 5.82     
Δ years of tenure  0.003  0.45   0.003 1.81       0.010 0.92    0.007  2.40       0.005 0.79 
(Δ years of tenure)
2  4·10
-4
 1.69  -1·10
-4
-0.38   -0.001 -1.55      -0.001 -1.71  -1·10
-4  -1.07  -1·10
-4  -0.88  -1·10
-4  -0.67 
Δ years of experience    -0.001 -12.64                  
(Δ years of experience)
2  -0.002 -7.45        -0.001 -2.70   -1·10
-4  -0.49   -0.001 -6.50  -4·10
-4  -3.78  1·10
-4  0.41 
N   1746     7561     758    1309    1688    751    1359 
R
2   0.175    0.07     0.377   0.005    0.202    0.389    0.002 
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Table 8 Regression of squared residuals on risk attitude 
  USA   Germany   Spain   Italy 
  coef  t   coef  t   coef  t   coef  t 
ln wages                        
Risk  3  0.003 0.09       -0.052  -1.44      
Risk  4  -0.041 -1.03       -0.072  -2.08      
Risk  (0-10)       0.024  5.61           
Absolute risk aversion                    -0.082  -2.77 
Assets 1·10
-7 6.99        0.042  2.28   -0.018  -0.87 
                    
∆ ln wages                        
Risk  3  -.445 -3.87        0.018  0.15      
Risk  4  -.035 -0.29        0.048  0.42      
Risk  (0-10)       0.035  5.66           
Absolute risk aversion                    -0.089  -2.77 
Assets 4·10
-9 0.07        0.133  1.92   -0.004  -0.21 
The residuals are from the regressions in Table 7a and 7b  
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7. Conclusion  
 
Shaw’s model can be considered a forerunner of the emerging research on the role of 
risk taking in schooling choices and their consequences. In her contribution she 
reports clear support for the prediction that individuals who are less afraid to take risk 
will experience higher wage growth. The prediction is based on the notion that human 
capital is a risky investment: less risk averse individuals invest more and thus will 
reap more benefits. In our replication we found a fair amount of support for the US, 
but les support for three European countries. We found little support for her specific 
model; restrictions on parameters following from her model were generally rejected. 
As we were not fully comfortable with the analytical model itself, we formulated a 
new model in the same spirit, taking the life-cyle investment profile as given and 
focusing on the mix between safe and risky human capital. Just as when testing of 
Shaw’s model, we found general support for the basic predictions of our model: 
wages are sensitive to an individual’s risk attitude and residual wage variance, a 
measure of risk, is indeed higher for individuals with lower risk aversion. Support is 
stronger for a regression in wage levels than in wage changes. Support for the 
relevance risk attitudes is also reported by Brown and Taylor (2003) for the UK and 
by Bonin at al (2007) for Germany. The impact on residual variance has not gotten 
much attention so far, but is an essential part of the story. 
 
Our conclusion from this paper is that continuing the line of research is promising. 
Both intuition and direct observation as well as empirical research indicate that risk 
taking is relevant in the labour market and that risk attitudes will matter. To move 
ahead, it would seem important to reflect on the possible channels of transmission of 
risk attitude on wages and wage growth. One may think of participation in training, 
the nature of these training programs (one type of training may provide more 
protection in the labour market than another) and of mobility, between jobs and 
employers. Job mobility may involve taking on new risks (although this depends on 
the nature of labour contracts) and we also know that voluntary movers usually have 
higher wage growth than stayers (see e.g. García-Pérez and Rebollo (2005)).  But also 40 
within firms, depending on the level and the nature of the job, there will be scope for 
more or less risky actions and initiatives and this may impact on careers. Charting his 
territory will be an interesting next step.  
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Appendix A. Description of the datasets. 
 
The results reported in this paper are based on the Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF), issued by the US Federal Reserve Board in cooperation with the Department 
of the Treasury; the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), conducted by the 
German Institute for Economic Research in Berlin, the Bank of Spain’s Encuesta 
Financiera de las Familias (EFF) and the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth (SHIW). 
 
These surveys include rich information on a large number of socio-economic 
variables on demography, education, employment, income, housing and wealth. The 
main goal of the SCF, the EFF and the SHIW is to provide detailed microeconomic 
information about the households’ wealth status and financial decisions. The GSOEP, 
in turn, puts less emphasis on household wealth to focus more explicitly on labour 
market and living conditions.  
 
In the following we describe the waves that we have used in the paper.  
 
SCF (1983-1989). The SCF is a cross sectional survey conducted every three years 
since 1983. Even though it has no panel structure, in 1986 a very brief re-interview 
was conducted with the 1983 SCF respondents. Shaw’s (1996) results are based on 
data from these re-interviewed households. However, this information is no longer 
publicly available: alter the 1989 wave it was decided to base the panel on the 1983 
and 1989 waves and disregard most of the information collected in 1986. Specifically, 
in the 1983-1989 panel “the 1986 SCF is treated only as a source of limited 
information for the construction of the cross-section variables mentioned above and 
for some very limited editing. No other information from the 1986 SCF is used in the 
construction of the 1983-1989 panel file and 1986 variables were not used to 
condition either the 1983 or 1989 imputations”. The results in this paper are, thus, 
based on the 1,479 households from the 1983 wave that were re-interviewed in 1989. 
For further details see Kennickell and Starr-McCluer (1997). 44 
 
GSOEP (2000-2004).  The German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) is a large 
household panel which includes all individuals older than 16 living in a sampled 
household. The SOEP panel started in the old Federal Republic of Germany in 1984 
and included the former East-Germany from 1990 onwards. In 2004 the panel 
included for the first time a question on risk. In the empirical analysis we therefore 
include the year 2004 and go back to 2000. The changes in wage and any other 
variable are defined on the 4-year span (from 2000 to 2004), to give the model a fair 
chance (the German results get very weak for shorter periods). In this way we closely 
replicate Shaw’s results. Using yearly changes instead leads to mostly non-significant 
coefficients. For obvious reasons the sample is restricted to those individuals who are 
working in both years. In order to look at wage changes, we have to assume that 
individuals’ risk attitudes measured in 2004 have been stable from 2000 to 2004.  
 
In the sample there are 7740 individuals who were present in both years, i.e. 2000 and 
2004. Following Shaw we delete from the sample individuals younger than 21 and 
older than 64 in 2004. Then we are left with 7631 observations. These are the ones we 
use in our regressions. 
 
EFF (2003). The first wave of the EFF is based on data collected from October 2002 
to May 2003. During that time, 5,143 households were interviewed. The EFF was 
modeled after the American SCF. Only 758 individuals out of 5 143 in the original 
sample report the starting salary in their actual firm. Since this variable is needed to 
calculate the annual wage growth used in our regressions, we are forced to work with 
such a small subsample. 
 
 
SHIW (1993-1995).  The data we use in our study comes from the Italian Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). It is a panel survey (annual from 1977 to 
1987 and biannual from 1989 to 2000) carried out by Banca d’Italia (Italian Central 
Bank). The survey contains detailed information on household characteristics, 45 
employment, income, assets, financial habits, type of home tenure and several 
questions related to homeownership and borrowing conditions. Additionally, starting 
from 1995, the survey also includes rotating questions aimed at the analysis of 
specific issues. The 1995 wave contains questions addressed to the household heads 
that allow us to construct a measure of absolute risk aversion. We use the waves 
corresponding to 1993 and 1995 to estimate real wage growth. We chose this two-
year interval as it provides an acceptable number of individuals with valid answers in 
the risk attitude question that are present in both waves (1,357 household heads). 
Alternative samples could be also constructed using the waves corresponding to 1995 
and 1998, or 1995 and 2000. However, these two periods would provide small 
samples, i.e. about 550 and 350 observations, respectively.  
 
The survey also provides information on the amount of assets held by the households. 
It allows us to construct a measure of risk behaviour based on the percentage of risky 
assets over all assets (see below). 
 
There are some concepts that are common across surveys and that we use in this 
paper: 
 
Households. A household is defined as a group of people that share expenses and the 
same dwelling. It includes household members that are temporarily absent and 
excludes domestic servants. The SCF and the EFF consider the person who chiefly 
deals with the financial issues of the household to be the household head. 
 
Earnings. We define labour earnings as the sum of after tax labour income both from 
paid employment and from self-employment. Note that we include only wage income 
from a person’s own business firm, not all income. 
 
Hourly wages. We define hourly earnings as after tax annual labour income divided 
by hours worked per period. Hours per period are based on measured hours per week, 
adjusted to match the observation period for earnings. In the Italian and the Spanish 46 
data, wages are deflated to real terms using the CPI series, in the other datasets they 
are not. This makes no difference if observation spells have equal length.  
 
Wealth. We define wealth as the value of assets minus debts. Our definition of assets 
includes financial and real assets, including the value of residences and real estate, 
businesses, vehicles, jewels, works of art, antiques, stock and fixed-income securities; 
bank accounts; mutual funds; the present value of pension schemes; the cash value of 
insurance policies, and other assets, including lent assets. The SCF and the EFF 
oversample wealthier households. Oversampling is intended to better characterize the 
economic status of the wealthy, and to get a sample that represents the total wealth 
holdings of the population. 
 
Weighting. To make the sample representative of the total population, the surveys 
include sampling weights. These weights are the inverse of the probability of being 
included in the sample, given the oversampling of the wealthy, geographical 
stratification, and differential unit non-response. This probability is calculated using 
the household socio-economic characteristics, such as the size of the municipality 
where the household is located, its census area, and its wealth and income level. In 
the Italian SHIW we do not apply weighting, as the sample is representative. 
 
Risk attitude (SCF, EFF and SHIW) 
Following Shaw (1996), we proxy the attitude of individuals towards risk using two 
different types of information. The first one is based on the proportion of risky assets 
that the individuals has relative to his total net worth. We follow Shaw in taking the 
share of risky financial assets among financial assets and not among all assets (or 
wealth). Residential investment, included in wealth but not in financial assets, is 
investment in a far less perfect market than the stock market and involves other 
considerations that would make the home investment less informative on risk 
attitudes. In line with Shaw we call this variable ‘ASSET’.  
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The problem with the asset variable is of course that many households have no risky 
assets. In the original Shaw data, 1072 households out of 2199 or 48.75 % have no 
risky financial assets. In our four data sets, the percentages having no risky financial 
assets are 42.8% in SCF, 55.8% in EFF and 88.1% in SHIW.  
 
 
The second type of information is form individual self-assessment of risk attitude. In 
SCF and EFF this is based on the question: 
 
●  Which of the following statements do you feel best describes your household 
in terms of the amount of financial risk you are willing to run when you 
make an investment? 
1.-Take on a lot of risk in the expectation of obtaining a lot of profit 
2.-Take on a reasonable amount of risk in the expectation of obtaining an 
above-normal profit 
3.-Take on a medium level of risk in the expectation of obtaining an average 
profit 
4.-You are not willing to take on financial risk 
 
Following Shaw, we define the dummy RISK4 = 1 if the individual answers “4” (= 0 




In the SOEP, the individuals’ risk attitudes are measured using a self-reported 
measure of willingness to take risks (for an extensive discussion on the validity of this 
measure in the SOEP see Dohmen et al., 2005 ). The question runs as follows, with 
different worodings for the different areas, e.g. occupation, health, or financial 
matters: 
 48 
People can behave differently in different situations. How would you rate your 
willingness to take risks in the following areas (……..)? 
where 0 means: 'risk averse' and the value 10 means: 'fully prepared to take risks' 
 
We use the risk measure with respect to occupation.  
 
Finally, in the SHIW, the second measure of risk-aversion is based on individual 
responses to the following question:  
 
“You are offered the opportunity of acquiring a security permitting you, with the 
same probability, either to gain 10 million lire (≅ €5,200) or to lose all the 
capital invested. What is the most you are prepared to pay for this security?” 
 
Using a Taylor series approximation to the utility function Hartog et al. (2002) 





















where  λ is the probability of wining this “lottery”, Z is the “prize” and P is the 
amount that individuals are willing to pay. According to (1), individuals who are 
willing to pay about 5 million lire (P≅€2,600) are assumed to be risk neutral 
(ARA=0). Below this amount, individuals are assumed to be risk averse (ARA>0); 
and above this amount, risk lovers (ARA<0). For maximum risk aversion (P=€0) we 
get ARA=2/Z, and for maximum risk loving (P≅€5,200) we get ARA=-2/Z. In the 
estimates we present we have multiplied ARA by 10, to get a more convienent scale.  
 
This measure has proven a good performance in studies regarding the effect of risk 
attitudes on individuals’ economic decisions (Diaz-Serrano, 2005). This author shows 
that this ARA measure computed with the same data exerts a significant negative 49 
effect on e.g. the investment in risky assets, the probability of being self-employed or 
the probability of being homeowner for households with risky incomes.  
 50 
APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL TABLES  
Table B1. Allowing ß to vary for human capital variables (equation (14)), ΔLn(hourly wage)  
   Risk dummies and Risk Attitude    Assets 
   US    Germany    Spain    Italy    US    Spain    Italy 
    coef  t   coef  t   coef  t   coef  t   coef  t   coef  t   coef  t 
Constant                            a0  1.588 5.4   0.216 7.13   -0.068 -0.12   0.143 1.52   0.555 3.21   -0.342 -2.62    -0.086 -1.47 
Asset             β0        1.223 1.59   -1.472 -2.22    -0.671 -1.26 
Risk (0-10 transf.)                 β0    -0.055 -0.44                
Risk 3 (averse)          β30  -1.045 -10.23    3.720 0.09               
Risk 4 (more averse)                      β40  -0.912 -9.36    0.761 0.05               
Absolute Risk Aversión (ARA)  β0       -0.713 -2.30              
Risk3 * (Δ years tenure/exp.)   β31     3.011 0.17               
Risk3 * (Δ years tenure)                β31  -1.673 -5.97                  
Risk3 * (Δ years tenure)^2  β32  -1.474 -6.29    2.760 0.05               
Risk3 * (Δ years experience)^2   β33  -0.873 -9.10    2.147 0.11               
Risk3 * Years education              Β34  -1.411 -3.24    -0.097 -0.07               
Risk4 * (Δ years tenure/exp.)   β41     2.449 0.16               
Risk4 * (Δ years tenure)                β41  -1.473 -5.10                  
Risk4 * (Δ years tenure)^2   β42  -1.008 -3.51    -1.462 -0.19               
Risk4 * (Δ years experience)^2   β43  -0.620 -4.73    2.522 0.12               
Risk4 * Years education              β44  -2.677 -2.63    -0.641 -1.15               
ARA * (Δ years tenure/exp.)   β1       -0.387 -2.23              
ARA * (Δ years tenure)                 β2       -0.486 -4.56              
ARA * (Δ years tenure)^2   β3       -1.331 -0.45              
ARA * (Δ years experience)^2   β4       -0.612 -3.16              
Risk0-10 * (Δ years tenure/exp.)   β1    0.716 0.99                
Risk0-10 * (Δ years tenure)              β2    2.864 0.39                
Risk0-10 * (Δ years tenure)^2   β3    0.130 1.63                51 
Risk0-10 * (Δ years 
experience)^2  
β4    17.945 0.06                
 (Δ years tenure/exp.)   aX1     0.015 0.23        0.050 2.99      
 (Δ years tenure)                   aX1  -0.043 -3.34   0.003 1.73    0.022 1.74   0.002 0.21          
 (Δ years tenure)^2   aX2  0.001 3.74   -1·10
-4 -0.41   -1·10
-4 -0.07   -0.001 -2.43   0.001 2.35   -0.001 -2.94      
 (Δ years experience)^2   aX3  -0.003 -6.55   -0.001 -12.65   -1·10
-4 -0.16   -3·10
-5 -0.30   -0.001 -6.06   -2·10
-4 -0.76      
 Years education              aX4  -0.032 -1.82   1·10
-4 0.06   0.032 0.74   -0.012 -1.76   0.007 0.63   0.030 3.37      
Asset * (Δ years tenure/exp.)   β1            0.969 1.04      
Asset * (Δ years tenure)                 β1        6.805 0.18        -0.728 -0.59 
Asset * (Δ years tenure)^2   β2        -1.394 -3.82   -1.846 -3.63    -0.389 -0.28 
Asset * (Δ years experience)^2   β3        0.482 3.05   5.320 0.59    1.363 0.43 
Asset * Years education              β4        -2.522 -0.86   -1.346 -2.42    -2.058 -0.72 
Male                                         aH1  -0.125 -3.08   0.002 0.20   0.114 2.29   0.019 0.36   -0.146 -3.46   0.114 2.34    0.012 0.25 
Union                                        aH2  -0.265 -4.22       -0.209 -2.88          
Black                                         aH3  0.059 1.23       -0.113 -2.36          
East                                           aH2       -0.001 -0.10                
German                                      aH3       -0.001 -0.05                 
Big firm                                     aH2            0.001 0.01         -0.057 -1.35      
Single                                         aH3            0.069 1.46   -0.014 -0.28        0.077 1.66    -0.037 -0.81 
Nonpermanent                           aH4            -0.116 -2.36         -0.102 -2.04      
Part time                                  aH4                 0.183 1.65             0.224 2.27 
Centre                                    aH4                 -0.066 -1.78             -0.058 -1.67 
South                                     aH4                 -0.052 -1.68             -0.031 -1.08 
Number  of  Observations      1,746   7,562    758   1,309   1,688     751   1,564 
χ
2 statistic    238.6
***    279.5
***    188.99
***    73.94
***    92.1
***    90.15
***    38.51
*** 
R
2      0.215    0.076    0.399    0.016    0.227    0.426    0.015 
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Table B2: Testing equality constraints of uniform risk interaction.  
    Variable Coeff. Table 2 Coeff. Table B1 Test
Constant  1.116 *  0.646  = 1.223 *  0.555 58.61 
Δ years tenure 1.116 *  0 .009  = 6.805  *  0.002 -115.42 
(Δ years tenure)^2 1.116 *  -1·10
-4  = -1.395  *  0.001 129.59 
(Δ years experience)^2 1.116 *  -0.001  = 0.482  * -0.001 -23.40 
ASSET 
Years of education 1.116 *  -0.004  = -2.522  *  0.007 -48.33 
               
Constant  -0.460 *  0.450  = -1.045 *  1.588 167.66 
Δ years tenure -0.460 *  -0.007  = -1.673 *  -0.043 -181.16 
(Δ years tenure)^2 -0.460 *  0.000  = -1.474 *  0.001 113.19 
(Δ years experience)^2 -0.460 *  -0.001  = -0.873 *  -0.003 -152.80 
Years of education -0.460 *  -0.021  = -1.411 *  -0.032 -104.53 
               
Constant  0.118 *  0.450  = -0.912 *  1.588 167.36 
Δ years tenure 0.118 *  -0.007  = -1.473 *  -0.043 -157.42 
(Δ years tenure)^2 0.118 *  0.000  = -1.008 *  0.001 76.08 
(Δ years experience)^2 0.118 *  -0.001  = -0.620 *  -0.003 -150.65 
US 
RISK 
Years of education 0.118 *  -0.021  = -2.677 *  -0.032 -153.90 
                 
RISK (Δ years experience)^2  0.025 *  -0.001  = 0.130 *  -0.001  -102.40  Germany 
               
Constant  1.249 *  -0.113  = -1.472 *  -0.342 -18.64 
Δ years tenure/exp. 1.249 *  0.042  = 0.968 *  0.050 -83.47 
(Δ years tenure)^2 1.249 *  1·10
-5  =  -1.846  *  -0.001 4.92 
(Δ years experience)^2 1.249 *  -4·10
-4  =  5.320  *  2·10
-4 87.61 
ASSET 
Years of education 1.249 *   0.010  = -1.346  *  0.030 22.12 
               
Constant  -0.067    *  -0.222  = 3.720 *  -0.068 22.83 
Δ years tenure/exp. -0.067    *  0.067  = 3.011 *  0.015 28.44 
(Δ years tenure)^2 -0.067    *  -1·10
-4  =   2.760  *  -1·10
-4 -41.51 
(Δ years experience)^2 -0.067    *  -5·10
-4  =  2.147  *  -1·10
-4 -9.60 
Years of education -0.067    *   0.023  = -0.097  *   0.032  -23.92 
              
Constant  -0.279    *  -0.222  = 0.761 *  -0.068 17.88 
Δ years tenure/exp. -0.279    *  0.067  = 2.449 *  0.015 39.40 
(Δ years tenure)^2 -0.279    *  -1·10
-4  =  -1.462  *  -1·10
-4 -41.29 
(Δ years experience)^2 -0.279    *  -5·10




Years of education -0.279    *   0.023  =  -0.641    *  0.032 -15.50 
                  
Constant  -0.593  *  0.166  = -0.713  *  0.143 1,76 
Δ years tenure -0.593  *  0.016  = -0.387  *  0.022 -2.96 
(Δ years tenure)^2 -0.593  *  -0.001  = -0.486  *  -0.001 4.50 
(Δ years experience)^2 -0.593  *  -1·10
-4  = -1.331  *  3·10
-5 -2.83 
RISK 
Years of education -0.593  *  -0.012  = -0.612  *  -0.012 -1.55 
                 
Constant  1.130  *  -0.042  = -6.714 *  -0.086 -77.25 
Δ years tenure 1.130  *  0.002  = -7.280  *  0.005  279.11
(Δ years tenure)^2 1.130  *  2·10
-5  = -3.890  *  -1·10
-4  -116.77
(Δ years experience)^2 1.130  *  4·10




Years of education 1.130  *  -0.001  = -20.576  *  0.002  863.52
Note: we test whether  j a β  (equation (13), Table 2) equals  jj a β   (equation (14), Table B1) 53 
Table B3a: US, unconstrained (equation (15)) 
   Risk  dummies ASSETS
  Coef t Coef  t
Constant                               a0 1.314 3.48 0.264  1.22   
Risk3 (averse)                           β3 -1.271 -3.05  
Risk4 (more averse)                     β4 -1.021 -1.96  
Asset                                      β0 1.805 3.59
  
Risk3 *(Δ years tenure) β31 0.081 3.55  
Risk3 *(Δ years tenure)^2 β32 -0.002 -4.32  
Risk3 *(Δ years experience)^2 β33 0.003 4.76  
Risk3 * Years education.             β34 0.037 1.46  
Risk3* Union                       β35 0.130 0.87  
Risk3 * Black                      β36 -0.371 -2.01  
Risk3 * Male                       β37 -0.250 -1.1  
  
Risk4 *(Δ years tenure) β41 0.064 2.32  
Risk4 *(Δ years tenure)^2 β42 -0.001 -1.74  
Risk4 *(Δ years experience)^2 β43 0.002 2.51  
Risk4 * Years education            β44 0.065 2.27  
Risk4* Union                       β45 -0.081 -0.49  
Risk4 * Black                      β46 -0.870 -4.00  
Risk4 * Male                       β47 -0.376 -1.47  
  
Asset *(Δ years tenure) β1 -0.005 -0.28
Asset *(Δ years tenure)^2 β2 -4·10
-4 -0.70
Asset *(Δ years experience)^2 β3 -0.002 -2.70
Asset * years education           β4 -0.039 -1.49
Asset * Union                       β5 -0.146 -1.35
Asset * Black                      β6 -0.234 -1.32
Asset * Male                       β7 -0.432 -1.98
  
Δ years tenure  ax1 -0.051 -2.37 0.013 1.37
(Δ years tenure)^2 ax2 0.001 3.35 3·10
-4 0.94
(Δ years experience)^2 ax3 -0.003 -5.99 -0.001 -3.01
Years education             ax4 -0.021 -0.92 0.010 0.64
Union                       ax5 -0.142 -1.01 -0.093 -1.38
Black                      ax6 0.240 1.62 -0.151 -1.79
Male                       ax7 0.281 1.31 0.005 0.05
    
Number of observations 1,746 1,688
χ







Table B3b: Germany, unconstrained (equation (15)) 
   Risk dummies 
Coef t 
Constant                                   a0 0.273 8.98 
Risk (0-10 transf.)                             β0 0.020 0.60 
  
Risk0-10  * (Δ years tenure) β1 -0.001 -0.32 
Risk0-10  * (Δ years tenure)^2 β2 0.000 0.42 
Risk0-10  * (Δ years experience)^2 β3 0.000 -2.11 
Risk0-10  * Years education           β4 0.001 0.58 
Risk0-10  * Male                              β5 -0.015 -1.37 
Risk0-10  * East                                β6 -0.014 -1.16 
Risk0-10  * German                      β7 0.004 0.26 
  
Δ years tenure ax1 0.003 1.31 
(Δ years tenure)^2 ax2 1·10
-4 0.27 
(Δ years experience)^2 ax3 -0.001 -13.57 
Years of education                ax4 -0.002 -1.03 
East                                          ax5 0.010 1.04 
German                                    ax6 0.001 0.07 
Male                                         ax7 -0.015 -1.64 
  








Table B3c: Spain, unconstrained (equation (15)) 
Risk dummies ASSETS
   Coef t Coef  t
Constant                                    a0 -0.419 -0.87    -0.303  -1.90
Risk3 (averse)                                  β3 0.165 0.31  
Risk4  (more averse)                        β4 0.283 0.55  
Asset                                           β0 0.379 1.02
Risk3 * (Δ years tenure/exp.) β31  0.130 1.78  
Risk3 * (Δ years tenure)^2 β32 -0.002 -1.53  
Risk3 * (Δ years experience)^2 β33 -0.001 -0.86  
Risk3 * Years education              β34 -0.016 -0.46  
Risk3 * Bigfirm                          β35 -0.290 -1.40  
Risk3 * Single                             β36 -0.687 -4.77  
Risk3 * Nopermanent                 β37  0.036 0.17  
Risk3 * Male                               β38  0.130 -1.67  
  
Risk4 * (Δ years tenure/exp.) β41 0.132 1.92  
Risk4 * (Δ years tenure)^2 β42 -0.002 -1.43  
Risk4 * (Δ years experience)^2 β43 -0.001 -0.96  
Risk4 * Years education              β44 -0.032 -0.92  
Risk4 * Bigfirm                         β45 -0.290 -1.51  
Risk4 * Single                           β46 -0.655 -4.91  
Risk4 * Nopermanent                β47 0.173 0.90  
Risk4 * Male                             β48 -0.318 -2.16  
  
Asset * (Δ years tenure/exp.) β1   0.057   1.20
Asset * (Δ years tenure)^2 β2   0.002   2.28
Asset * (Δ years experience)^2 β3  -0.001  -1.73
Asset * Years education              β4  -0.036  -1.37
Asset * Bigfirm                          β5  -0.106  -0.64
Asset * Single                            β6   0.172   0.96
Asset * Nopermanent                 β7   0.051   0.43
Asset * Male                              β8   0.060   0.40
  
(Δ years tenure/exp.) ax1 -0.076 -1.20  0.048   1.74
(Δ years tenure)^2  ax2 0.002 1.53 -0.001 -2.04
(Δ years experience)^2 ax3 3·10
-3 0.40 -2·10
-4 -0.51
Years of education                      ax4 0.045 1.39  0.028   2.50
Bigfirm                                       ax5 0.275 1.58 -0.027 -0.41
Single                                          ax6  0.701 5.97  0.042   0.78
Nopermanent                              ax7 -0.249 -1.33   -0.111  -2.29
Male                                            ax8 0.406 3.03  0.100   2.15
  
Number of observations 758 751
χ











Table B3d: Italy, unconstrained (equation (15)) 
   ARA  ASSETS 
Coef t Coef t
Constant                                         a0  0.139 1.13   -0.081 -1.37 
Absolute Risk Aversion (ARA)     β0  -0.104 -1.54      
Asset                                            β0       0.747  1.66 
            
ARA * (Δ years tenure)  β1  -0.006 -0.83      
ARA * (Δ years tenure)^2  β2  4·10
-4 2.03      
ARA * (Δ years experience)^2  β3  6·10
-5 0.91      
ARA* Years education               β4  0.008 2.25      
ARA*  Male                                  β5  -0.071 -1.33      
ARA * Part time                            β6  0.616 4.36      
ARA * Single                                β7  -0.049 -1.13      
ARA * Centre                                β8  0.024 0.68      
ARA * South                                 β9  0.033 1.08      
            
Asset * (Δ years tenure)  β1       -0.043  -0.82 
Asset * (Δ years tenure)^2  β2       4·10
-4 0.36 
Asset * (Δ years experience)^2  β3       3·10
-4 0.68 
Asset * Years education              β4       -0.050  -2.17 
Asset * male                                  β5       -0.824  -2.24 
Asset * part time                            β6       1.403  1.49 
Asset * single                               β7       -0.670  -2.39 
Asset * Centre                              β8       0.087  0.35 
Asset * South                                 β9       0.305  1.51 
            
(Δ years tenure)  ax1  0.017 1.33   0.005  0.73 
(Δ years tenure)^2  ax2  -0.001 -2.29   -1·10
-4 -0.52 
(Δ years experience)^2  ax3  -6·10
-5 -0.48   3·10
-5 0.57 
Years of education                         ax4  -0.014 -2.04   0.002  0.59 
Centre                                            ax5  -0.084 -1.33   -0.062  -1.72 
South                                              ax6  -0.050 -1.63   -0.034  -1.18 
Male                                               ax7  0.133 1.39   0.051  0.98 
Single                                             ax8  0.057 0.74   0.002  0.04 
Part time                                         ax9  -0.824 -3.25   0.199  1.94 
            
Number of observations      1,309      1,564 
χ
2 statistic      61.20     20.68
**
R
2     0.032      0.016 
F-test     2.39
**    1.39 
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Table B4a: US, Estimated coefficients β, unconstrained a priori model (equation 
(15) with Shaw H,X distinction. 
βkj (eq.15)   βj (eq.15)
Coef t  Coef  t
Constant                                 a0 1.588 4.15  0.639 3.32
Risk 3 risk averse                     β3 -1.491 -3.44   
Risk 4 more risk averse              β4 -1.657 -3.38   
Asset                                            β0  -0.792 -1.30
    
Risk3 * (Δ years tenure) β31 0.072 3.36   
Risk3 * (Δ years tenure)^2 β32 -0.002 4.09   
Risk3 * (Δ years experience)^2 β33 0.002 4.20   
Risk3 * Years education             β34 0.045 1.82   
    
Risk4 * (Δ years tenure) β41 0.064 2.39   
Risk4 * (Δ years tenure)^2 β42 -0.001 -1.93   
Risk4 * (Δ years experience)^2 β43 0.002 2.25   
Risk4 * Years education           β44 0.087 2.99   
    
Asset * (Δ years tenure) β1  0.115 2.80
Asset * (Δ years tenure)^2 β2    -0.004 -3.05
Asset * (Δ years experience)^2 β3  0.001 2.17
Asset * Years education             β4  0.042 1.11
    
Δ years tenure  aX1 -0.043 -2.15  -0.004 -0.43
(Δ years tenure)^2  aX2 0.001 3.15  1·10
-5 2.10
(Δ years experience)^2 aX3 -0.003 -5.46  -0.001 -5.56
Years of education                          aX4 -0.032 -1.41  0.005 0.41
Union                                         aH1 -0.125 -2.58  -0.113 -2.40
Black                                              aH2 -0.265 -2.97  -0.301 -3.71
Male                                                aH3 0.059 0.72  0.002 0.02
    
Number of observations 1,746     1,746
χ
2 statistic  357
***    237
***
R
2 0.115     0.091
F-test 9.98     9.40
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Table B4b: German SOEP, Estimated coefficients β, unconstrained a priori model 
(equation (15) with Shaw H, X distinction) 
 
    βkj (eq15) 
Coef t 
Constant                                   a0 0.272 9.03 
Risk (0-10 transf.)                        β0 0.013 0.42 
  
Risk0-10  * (Δ years tenure) β1 -0.001 -0.28 
Risk0-10  * (Δ years tenure)^2 β2 1·10
-4 0.36 
Risk0-10  * (Δ years  β3 -1·10
-4 -2.17 
Risk0-10  * Years education           β4 0.001 0.54 
  
Δ years tenure aX1 0.003 1.30 
(Δ years tenure)^2 aX2 1·10
-4 0.29 
(Δ years experience)^2 aX3 -0.001 -13.65 
Years education           aX4 -0.002 -1.01 
East                                         aH1 0.011 1.07 
German                                   aH2 1·10
-4 0.03 
Male                                        aH3 -0.014 -1.51 
  









Table B4c: Spain, Estimated coefficients β, unconstrained a priori model (equation 
(15) with Shaw H, X distinction) 
    βkj (eq.15)    βj (eq.15) 
Coef t Coef t
Constant                                      a0 -0.068 -0.12 -0.342 -2.17
Risk 3 (averse)                       β3 -0.252 -0.44  
Risk 4 (more averse)             β4 -0.052 -0.09  
Asset                                         β0 0.504 1.63
  
Risk3 * (Δ years tenure/exp.) Β31 0.046 0.56  
Risk3 * (Δ years tenure)^2 β32 -2·10
-4 -0.20  
Risk3 * (Δ years experience)^2 β33 -3·10
-4 -0.26  
Risk3 * Years education              β34 -0.003 -0.07  
  
Risk4 * (Δ years tenure/exp.) β41 0.037 0.48  
Risk4 * (Δ years tenure)^2 β42 1·10
-4 0.11  
Risk4 * (Δ years experience)^2 β43 3·10
-4 -0.31  
Risk4 * Years education              β44 -0.020 -0.44  
  
Asset * (Δ years tenure/exp.) β1 0.048   1.04
Asset * (Δ years tenure)^2 β2  0.002   2.39
Asset * (Δ years experience)^2 β3 -0.001 -1.62
Asset * Years education              β4 -0.040 -1.64
  
Δ years tenure/exp.  aX1 0.015 0.21  0.050   1.81
(Δ years tenure)^2  aX2 -1·10
-4 -0.08  -0.001  -2.17
(Δ years experience)^2 aX3 -1·10
-4 -0.13 -2·10
-4 -0.49
Years education              aX4 0.032 0.71  0.030   2.60
Bigfirm                                    aH1 0.001 0.01 -0.057 -1.01
Single                                       aH2 0.069 1.42  0.077   1.58
Nopermanent                           aH3 -0.116 -2.96 -0.102 -2.51
Male                                         aH4 0.114 2.44  0.114   2.51
  
Number of observations 758   751
χ
















Table B4d: Italy. Estimated coefficients β, unconstrained a priori model (equation 
(15) with Shaw H, X distinction) 
ARA  ASSETS
Coef t  Coef  t
Constant                                      a0 0.143 1.52  -0.086  -1.47
Absolute Risk Aversion (ARA)       β3 -0.102 -2.24   
Asset                                         β0  0.576  1.89
    
ARA * (Δ years tenure) β41 -0.088 -1.23   
ARA * (Δ years tenure)^2 β42 5·10
-4 2.18   
ARA * (Δ years experience)^2 β43 5·10
-5 0.71   
ARA * Years education              β44 0.007 1.94   
    
Asset * (Δ years tenure) β1  -0.035  -0.68
Asset * (Δ years tenure)^2 β2  4·10
-4 0.28
Asset * (Δ years experience)^2 β3  4·10
-4 0.85
Asset * Years education              β4  -0.052  -2.28
    
Δ years tenure  aX1 0.022 1.74  0.005  0.75
(Δ years tenure)^2  aX2 -0.001 -2.43  -1·10
-4 -0.55
(Δ years experience)^2 aX3 4·10
-5 -0.30  3·10
-5 0.57
Years education              aX4 -0.012 -1.76  0.002  0.69
Male                                          aH1 0.012 0.36  0.012  0.25
Single                                        aH2 -0.014 0.28  -0.037  -0.81
Part time                                   aH3 0.183 1.65  0.224  2.27
Centre                                        aH4 -0.066 -1.78  -0.058  -1.67
South                                         aH4 -0.052 -1.68  -0.031  -1.08
            
Number of observations      1,309      1,564 
χ
2 statistic    37,85
***   17.83
*** 
R
2     0.015      0.011 
F-test     1.41      1.21 
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Table B5a: Testing model constraints: identical risk effect ( jj a θ β = ) 
    Variable Coeff.  Table  2    Coeff. 
Table B4 
Test 
Constant 1.116 * 0.646  = 0.639 -76.98
Δ years tenure 1.116 * 0 .009  = -0.005 -109.04
(Δ years tenure)^2 1.116 * -1·10
-4  =  -1·10
-5  -26.38
(Δ years experience)^2 1.116 * -0.001  = -0.001 118.53
ASSET 
Years of education 1.116 * -0.004  = 0.006  3.43
         
Constant -0.460 * 0.450  = 1.589  -191.23
Δ years tenure -0.460 * -0.007  = -0.043 -132.58
(Δ years tenure)^2 -0.460 * 0.000  = 0.001 156.55
(Δ years experience)^2 -0.460 * -0.001  = -0.003 -121.10
Years of education -0.460 * -0.021  = -0.032  -90.43
         
Constant 0.118 * 0.450  = 1.588  -166.03
Δ years tenure 0.118 * -0.007  = -0.043 -101.07
(Δ years tenure)^2 0.118 * 0.000  = 0.001  82.33
(Δ years experience)^2 0.118 * -0.001  = -0.003 -100.79
US 
RISK 
Years of education 0.118 * -0.021  = -0.032 -120.83
           
Germany  RISK  (Δ years experience)^2  0.025 * -0.001  =  1·10
-4  -138.01 
          
Constant 1.249 * -0.113  = -0.342  19.12
Δ years tenure/exp. 1.249 * 0.042  =   0.050  -49.01
(Δ years tenure)^2 1.249 * 1·10
-5  =   -0.001  3.78
(Δ years experience)^2 1.249 * -4·10
-4  =  -2·10
-4  49.43
ASSET 
Years of education 1.249 *   0.010  =   0.030  28.84
         
Constant -0.067    * -0.222  = -0.068  -0.26
Δ years tenure/exp. -0.067    * 0.067  =   0.015  -18.43
(Δ years tenure)^2 -0.067    * -1·10
-4  = -1·10
-4 6.99
(Δ years experience)^2 -0.067    * -5·10
-4  = -1·10
-4 9.64
Years of education -0.067    *  0.023  =   0.032  0.81
         
Constant -0.279    * -0.222  = -0.068  0.23
Δ years tenure/exp. -0.279    * 0.067  =   0.015  -13.81
(Δ years tenure)^2 -0.279    * -1·10
-4  = -1·10
-4 -5.17
(Δ years experience)^2 -0.279    * -5·10




Years of education -0.279    *  0.023  =   0.032  10.01
          
Constant -0.593 * 0.166   -0.015  66.08
Δ years tenure -0.593 * 0.016  = -0.009  2.10
(Δ years tenure)^2 -0.593 * -0.001  = 5·10
-4 3.07
(Δ years experience)^2 -0.593 * -1·10
-4  = 5·10
-5 3.40
RISK 
Years of education -0.593 * -0.012  = 0.008  4.16
         
Constant 1.130 * -0.042   -0.049 -0.6143
Δ years tenure 1.130 * 0.002  = -0.035 -280.42
(Δ years tenure)^2 1.130 * 2·10
-5  = 4·10
-4 117.99
(Δ years experience)^2 1.130 * 4·10




Years of education 1.130 * -0.001  = -0.052 -870.11
We test the constraints while maintaining the Shaw a priori H, X distinction: Table2 against B4 62 
Table B5b: Testing model constraints: specific risk effects ( jj j a θ β = ) 
    Variable Coeff.  Table  B1    Coeff. 
Table B4 
Test 
Constant 1.223 * 0.555 =  0.639 89.03
Δ years tenure 6.805 * 0.002  =  -0.005 35.74
(Δ years tenure)^2 -1.395 * 0.001  =  -1·10
-5  -35.11
(Δ years experience)^2 0.483 * -0.001  =  -0.001 114.92
ASSET 
Years of education -2.522 * 0.007  =  0.006 -2.45
      
Constant -1.045 * 1.588 =  1.589 261.17
Δ years tenure -1.673 * -0.043  =  -0.043 0.90
(Δ years tenure)^2 -1.474 * 0.001  =  0.001 -37.10
(Δ years experience)^2 -0.873 * -0.003  =  -0.003 -10.90
Years of education -1.411 * -0.032  =  -0.032 0.62
    
Constant -0.912 * 1.588 =  1.588 238.04
Δ years tenure -1.473 * -0.043  =  -0.043 0.70
(Δ years tenure)^2 -1.008 * 0.001  =  0.001 -19.94
(Δ years experience)^2 -0.620 * -0.003 =  -0.003 -6.26
US 
RISK 
Years of education -2.677 * -0.032  =  -0.032 1.07
        
RISK  (Δ years experience)^2  0.130 *  -0.001  =  1·10
-4  -49.17  Germany 
      
Constant -1.472 * -0.342 =  -0.342 15.01
Δ years tenure/exp. 0.968 * 0.050  =   0.050 0.01
(Δ years tenure)^2 -1.846 * -0.001  =   -0.001 -0.04
(Δ years experience)^2 5.320 * 2·10
-4 =  -2·10
-4  0.13
ASSET 
Years of education -1.346 * 0.030  =   0.030 0.02
      
Constant 3.720 * -0.068 =  -0.068 18.86
Δ years tenure/exp. 3.011 * 0.015  =   0.015 31.49
(Δ years tenure)^2  2.760 * -1·10
-4 =  -1·10
-4 -30.75
(Δ years experience)^2 2.147 * -1·10
-4 =  -1·10
-4 -13.17
Years of education -0.097 * 0.032  =   0.032 -14.64
    
Constant 0.761 * -0.068 =  -0.068 14.24
Δ years tenure/exp. 2.449 * 0.015  =   0.015 34.17
(Δ years tenure)^2 -1.462 * -1·10
-4 =  -1·10
-4 -20.79
(Δ years experience)^2  2.522 * -1·10




Years of education -0.641   0.032  =   0.032 -17.48
        
Constant -0.713 0.143   -0.015 66.01
Δ years tenure -0.387 * 0.022  =  -0.009 -0.83
(Δ years tenure)^2 -0.486 * -0.001  =  5·10
-4 7.59
(Δ years experience)^2 -1.331 * -3·10
-5 =  5·10
-5 0.56
RISK 
Years of education -0.612 * -0.012  =  0.008 2.58
    
Constant -6.714 -0.086   -0.049 -80.28
Δ years tenure -7.280 * 0.005  =  -0.035 -0.97
(Δ years tenure)^2 -3.890 * -1·10
-4 =  4·10
-4 1.81
(Δ years experience)^2 13.620 * 3·10




Years of education -20.576 * 0.002  =  -0.052 -4.38
We test the constraints while maintaining the Shaw a priori H, X distinction: Table B1 against B4 